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If the police and data protection registrars can be
unclear and contradictory about laws regarding
information about individuals, as they seem to be in
the United Kingdom (UK), how does this affect those
who want to access data in primary care computer
systems for non-clinical purposes?1
The UK Data Protection Act of 1998 has presented
challenges for those engaged in epidemiological
research using patient data.2,3 But the precise meaning
of this Act, and others that flow from European human
rights legislation, is still very much open to inter-
pretation. In this climate of uncertainty, custodians 
of health information might feel that the only way 
to protect themselves from future allegations of
impropriety with data is to take the most conservative
option when considering requests from researchers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Caldicott Guardians and
other controllers of individually identifiable patient
data have often been reluctant to give permission to
access data for fear of acting unlawfully.4
Debate as to what research activities may legally 
be undertaken has occurred in research ethics com-
mittees, scientific grant-awarding bodies, the General
Medical Council, the British Medical Association and
the Royal Colleges, but a unified opinion has not 
yet emerged.5,6 Such conflicts between individual 
data subjects’ rights and the benefits to patients and
society are not unique to the UK. Legislation in the
United States (US), New Zealand and Australia poses
similar challenges to health professionals and
academics.7
The conservatism of this uncertain environment
creates problems for those who seek to carry out
research with routinely collected health information.
Where databases have been maintained for a long
period of time, the current climate threatens their
continuity, potentially destroying some of the most
unique and valuable aspects of long-term structures
in the health system.8
At worst, conservatism over data protection can
impede clinical governance and research activities
even when there is a clear and relatively uncontroversial
need for them. In 2001, a New Zealand ministerial
inquiry reported upon an investigation of serious
faults in the national cervical screening programme,
which resulted in undetected cancers and subsequent
deaths. The inquiry found that there were substantial
impediments to the collection of information for the
effective monitoring and evaluation of the cervical
screening programme; it was recommended that legis-
lative changes be implemented in order to facilitate
the necessary information collection, and that the role
of ethics committees be clarified so they would not
delay audit, monitoring and evaluation activities.9 In
the atmosphere of concern about data protection, those
recommendations have taken three years to implement,
rather than the six months originally proposed.10
In the absence of definitive arbitration from the
courts about approaches to working within the legis-
lation, a means of clarification that investigators are
unlikely to pursue by choice, the process of bringing
greater certainty to the conduct of research based upon
individual-level information will have to proceed
through a renewed effort to achieve consensus.11,12 This
has greater urgency for some researchers than for others.
In primary care, with its inherently distributed and
fragmented infrastructure, the ability to link data at
the individual level is key to many research projects.
This can be contrasted with institutional healthcare set-
tings where the information for a piece of research might
well be collected routinely under the aegis of a single
organisation, making further data linkage less critical.
The Nuffield Trust has identified three alternative
approaches to the problem of using individual informa-
tion for research purposes. Briefly, these are:13
 use personal data with consent or other assent from
the data subjects
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 anonymise the data, and then use them
 use personal data without explicit consent, under a
public-interest mandate.
The second of these proposals has been explored in
Scotland, with the concept of ‘acceptable anonym-
isation’ proposed by a Committee on Confidentiality
and Security.14 This approach allows data from
primary care to be extracted into regional repositories
of data where, with appropriate ethical committee
and Caldicott Guardian approvals, it may be linked to
other data sources for the purposes of research and
clinical governance.15 To date this system appears to
be serving the needs of the various stakeholders,
and has the support of researchers and information
guardians.
The cost of this approach is in the additional layer
of management required to conduct the anonymisation
process independently from researchers. This involves
providing staff and facilities for the linking and an-
onymising task, which can be substantial. It also
involves allowing time for researchers and anonym-
isation staff to work together to develop a mutual
understanding of the dataset and the research
imperatives, so they can accurately specify the dataset
for any one research project. These costs can be
significant, but they are crucial to the success of a
programme which meets the needs of ethical data
management as well as effective research. However, it is
envisaged that as experience with the system develops,
and as new technology is implemented, access to data
will become more direct within the ethical constraints
that are embedded in the system.
The use of routinely collected individual patient
data for research purposes is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon. The necessary technology to collect data in
a timely fashion from many sources, to collate them in
a consistent way and to render the results in a form
that is useful to researchers has only become widely
available in recent years. Most readers of this journal
will not need to be convinced that these techniques
bring considerable new powers to investigate and
improve health systems, but it is important always to
be conscious that the ability to conduct this type of
research is dependent upon having effective safe-
guards against the misuse of research resources. While
the atmosphere of uncertainty about data protection
presents, in some respects, a threat to informatics
research in primary care, it should also serve as an
extra motivation to the research community to develop
effective ethical processes for managing information
that justify the trust of the community. Uncertainty is
a challenge, but a positive response to that challenge
will bring us a stronger system for managing individual
data in health research.
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